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We study how sponsored ads which are classically 
inserted in Web pages could also be inserted in 
XML documents such as Ebooks. Advertisers set 
prices for words and DTDs, and a Vickrey 
mechanism would select an ad for some price. 
The approximate distance between a 
document and any DTD, which is easy to compute, 
allows to associate a value to a new document in 
such a market, as a combination of the price and  
the distance. 
We describe a simple auction for one ad and 
its generalization to several ads. 
 




There is a large source of new documents in 
normalized XML formats, which can be freely 
distributed : short novels, technical documents, 
catalogs. This is a new market for sponsored adds. 
We consider an economic setting, where 
sponsored ads can be inserted into XML documents, 
in particular Ebooks viewed  as specific XML 
documents, and where advertisers target DTDs 
(Data Type Definition, i.e. XML Schemas) which 
generalize the classical keywords and capture the 
structure of  the documents. As for sponsored ads 
such as GoogleAdWords where the 
advertisers  define an ad and set private prices  for 
sets of  keywords, the advertisers  define a similar 
ad but  set private prices for several DTDs.  We 
study a mechanism, inspired by Vickrey auctions 
which will allocate an ad to any Ebook  for some 
price. 
We use an Edit distance between documents 
and DTDs, which is easy to approximate [1], even 
on Streaming documents and  associate to any 
Ebook its relative distance 0<d<1  to all the 
known DTDs of the central mechanism.   If the 
Ebook is at distance di  of  DTDi, valued for a 
price pi, we define its private value as (1- di). pi.   
We then set a Vickrey auction [2] on these values: 
we allocate the ad with the highest value for a price 
of the second best   value. We will  show that 
this mechanism keeps the fundamental  Vickrey 
properties. 
This approach can be generalized to several 
ads in  a given Ebook, and to several positions 
inside  the document.  In the first case, we allocate 
k ads instead of one ad, and in the second case we 
consider the distance as a dynamic value over the 
streaming document and record the positions which 
minimize the distances  to several DTDs. 
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